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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SEARCH OF
THE SHAREHOLDER-MANAGER
BALANCE OF POWER
Razeen Sappideen*
INTRODUCTION
Recent legislation intended to strengthen shareholder power
over managers and the Board of Directors ("Board" or "Boards")
through legislative measures such as say on pay, compensation
clawbacks, and requiring Boards to submit themselves for re-election
in the United States ("U.S.), United Kingdom ("U.K."), and Austra-
lia has led to the strengthening of blockholder (i.e. investment funds,
hedge funds, etc.) power over managers and the rest of the shareholder
body. At the same time, these developments also enable managers to
act opportunistically and protect their interests by being more accom-
modating to the demands of blockholders. The formation of such alli-
ances between managers and blockholders can negatively impact the
rest of the shareholder body and should therefore be brought to ac-
count. This article examines the causes and consequences of these de-
velopments, and ways of addressing the resulting issues.
Corporation law provides for a formalised legal model of power
sharing between the Board and shareholders, with the Board as the
centrepiece. Under this formalised structure, senior managers are
hired by and are responsible to the Board, with the Board itself ac-
countable to the shareholder body at its general meeting. As to
whether this ideal was ever achieved, should be achieved, or can be
achieved outside of the proprietary or private company setup, has been
the subject of some debate.' Nevertheless, the search for this holy grail
continues, if only for the reason that managerial and Board accounta-
bility to the shareholder body is regarded as being the best way to en-
sure the efficiency, competitiveness, and accountability of the
corporation. Ensuring the latter has been a continuing process, and a
challenge to all concerned. Phrases such as "pay without perform-
ance "2 and "strong managers, weak owners,"' suggest that managers
* Foundation Professor of Law, University of Western Sydney
1 See generally Walter Werner, Corporations Law in Search of its Future, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 1611 (1982); Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boar-
droom, 35 Bus. LAw. 101 (1979); Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties
for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255 (2008).
2 See LuciAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, Pay Without Performance, The Un-
fulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation (2004).
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seem to have got the better of Boards and shareholders. At the same
time, attempts to ensure shareholder control over managers have not
been altogether welcome.4 The last two decades have seen a series of
legislative measures introduced to make Boards and managers more
accountable to the shareholder body, ranging from the requirement
that managerial compensation be subjected to review by the share-
holder body, to the requirement that Board members submit them-
selves for re-election annually.5 These developments, however, appear
to have produced somewhat unanticipated outcomes: the emergence of
blockholder6 power as a major controlling influence within the corpo-
ration on the one hand, and the opportunity for managers' to advance
their self-interest by being more accommodating to blockholder
interests.
This article examines the growing influence of blockholder
power on the corporate power shareholding relationship in the U.S.,
U.K., and Australia following the introduction of the regulatory mea-
sures referred to above. These latter jurisdictions, in addition to being
advanced industrial economies, also share the characteristics of a com-
mon language and system of Corporation Law that has its roots in
U.K. Company Law.' It seeks to make three points. The first is that it
is important to disentangle the need for managerial accountability
from the purported role of blockholders in facilitating this accountabil-
ity. The issue, in other words, is not so much about making managers
and boards accountable to the shareholder body, as it is about the role
of blockholders in bringing this about. Second, that the recent legisla-
tive changes empower blockholders to lean on managers to adopt
courses of action favorable to blockholders, but which may not necessa-
rily be in the interests of the corporation and its other shareholders.
This is because the interests of blockholders and of the general share-
3 MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS WEAK OWNERS, THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMER-
ICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994).
4 See generally Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 1; Lipton, supra note 1.
5 See infra in Part III.
6 Blockholders mean transient controlling interests held by private equity funds,
activist hedge funds, pension funds and other investment funds able by them-
selves or in alliance with other shareholder groupings to persuade managers to
implement changes they have in mind, including the transfer of control. The dis-
cussion here is of blockholders in widely dispersed shareholding corporations, and
excludes control retained by individuals/families.
7 The term managers as used in this article varies with the context, and refers to
Executive directors such as the Chief Executive Officer and the Chief Financial
Officer where the discussion is about their accountability to the Board of directors,
and at other times to the entire Board of which the CEO and CFO are part of.
8 The terms corporations, company, enterprise and firm are used interchangeably
here, as are corporations' law and company law.
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holder body often diverge, as much as the interests of managers and
shareholders do, generating with agency problems of its own. Third,
these developments create the opportunity for managers and
blockholders to further their respective interests at the expense of the
rest of the shareholder body, rather than increase the accountability of
managers to the general shareholder body. The challenges posed to
corporate governance by managers and blockholders acting together is
the subject of study in this article.
The discussion in the article is structured as follows. Part I ex-
amines the shaping of power relationships in the large modern corpo-
ration. Part II investigates how the strategy of stock based incentive
compensation helped managers to further consolidate their power.
Part III examines how say on pay and associated legislation attempts
to swing the balance of power in favor of the shareholder body. Part IV
examines the ascendancy of blockholder power. Part V examines likely
outcomes in the manager-blockholder relationship under the present
set up. Part VI concludes the discussion presented in this article.9
I. BOARDS, MANAGERS, SHAREHOLDERS, AND BLOCKHOLDERS
Following Berle and Means, a substantial part of corporation
law and governance has been concerned with addressing the separa-
tion problem and the erosion of shareholder power vis a vis manag-
ers. 10 Three developments in the marketplace in these early stages
accounted for this erosion. First, the large corporation's need to access
funds from the public, particularly equity funds, from a large and scat-
tered cohort of shareholders unable to communicate with each other-
otherwise, known as the coordination problem-made them almost en-
tirely dependent on managers to do so. Second, the need for fulltime
professional managers to run the enterprise saw a diminution of both
shareholder and Board power. Third, the ability of managers to recom-
mend appointments and reappointments to the Board (and more re-
cently to Board committees), recommend compensation packages to be
paid to Board members and the appointment of remuneration consul-
tants, control over information provided to financial analysts (and the
ability to manipulate earnings reports), as well as the formulation of
takeover defences in the face of hostile bids, assisted managers in con-
solidating their control. Consequently, managers emerged as the most
powerful of this group of power brokers, enjoying an almost unfettered
hand in the carrying on of the business activities of the enterprise.
9 The article does not consider individual/family blockholders as they generally
hold for the long term and are more the exception than the norm.
10 See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (discussing the governance theory of separating
ownership and control).
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Moreover, to the extent that managers could keep the Board and
shareholders from uniting against them, and otherwise appease con-
trolling shareholders, they enjoyed control over the enterprise.
Attempts to restrain managerial power from within the corpo-
ration appears to have had mixed success, with the pendulum swing-
ing to and fro. For example, as managers were able to game incentive
compensation schemes" intended to reward effort and success, pay
legislation, which requires compensation packages to be approved by
the shareholder body, followed. This has been strengthened in the
U.K. and U.S. by legislation enabling the clawback of compensation
already paid out. Moreover, the U.K. Corporate Governance Code 2012
requires board members of the top 350 Financial Times Stock Ex-
change ("FTSE") companies to submit themselves for re-election every
year, while Australia's "two-strike" rule requires Boards to submit
themselves for re-election in the event the executive compensation
package approved by the Board is rejected at a second consecutive an-
nual general meeting. 12 There are three prongs to these regulatory
measures. 1 3 First, there is the requirement that managerial pay be
approved by the shareholder body at its Annual General Meeting. Sec-
ond, as managerial compensation is ultimately the responsibility of
the Board, and since it is Boards that are subject to the two strike rule
or to annual re-election as the case may be, it is expected that the
Board will take much greater care in ensuring that managerial pay is
linked to managerial performance, and that managers earn their pay.
Third, and most importantly, the measures seek to ensure on the one
hand the independence of the Board from managers, and on the other
their dependence on the shareholder body.' 4 The cumulative impact of
these measures then has been to subject managers to greater account-
ability to both the Board and the shareholder body. Put more simply,
these changes make both Boards and managers more accountable to
the shareholder body. In the context of the marketplace, however, as
distinct from the shareholder body as an abstract entity, they also beg
the question as to what is meant by the shareholder body. The phe-
nomenon of the "controlling" shareholder or shareholder block has al-
ways been a feature of Corporation Law and governance. In fact,
corporate governance has at various times seen controlling share-
holder blocks as providing the balance to managerial control. But, as
this article highlights, the control wielded by present day blockholders
is far more strategic and potent than the power wielded by
blockholders previously. It is in this latter day context that the power
11 See discussion infra Part II.
12 See discussion infra Part III.
13 See discussion infra Part III.
14 See discussion infra Part IV.
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of blockholders to "discipline" managers as they see fit, and to lean on
them to do their bidding must be understood and evaluated. For exam-
ple, the U.S. experience on the effectiveness and scope of intervention
by activist funds is revealing, as evidenced in the following:
Recently, hedge funds have pressured McDonald's to
spin off major assets in an IPO; asked Time Warner to
change its business strategy; threatened or commenced
proxy contests at HJ Heinz, Master Energy, KT&G, in-
foUSA, Sitel, and GenCorp; made a bid to acquire Hous-
ton Exploration; pushed for a merger between Euronext
and Deutsche Borse; pushed for 'changes in management
and strategy' at Nabi Biopharmaceuticals; opposed ac-
quisitions by Novartis of the remaining 58% stake in
Chiron, by Sears Holdings of the 46% minority interest
in Sears Canada, by Micron of Lexar Media, and by a
group of private equity firms of VNU; threatened litiga-
tion against Delphi; and pushed for litigation against
Calpine that led to the ouster of its two top executives."5
Reports indicate that in 2013, blockholders in the U.S. ran 82
public campaigns against U.S. companies with market values in excess
of $500 million.16 While not all blockholders are activists, the activities
of those that are has caused much unrest.1 7 Blockholders range from
passive institutional shareholders, to more recently, activist invest-
ment and hedge funds.'" Their actions may complement or substitute
the activities of arbitrageurs and hostile bidders." While one of the
cornerstones of corporation law is the notion that each share of a class
of shares has the same rights and entitlements as any other share of
that class, the market nevertheless pays a premium for a shareholding
that can transfer or facilitate control of the entity, as controlling share
15 Id.
16 See Tim Binsted, Advisers Warn of Surge in Activism, AUSTL. FIN. REV., June 2,
2014, at 28, available at https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/1927a093-a3a8-
4821-b66c- lf21567005lf]?context=1000516.
17 See id.
18 See, e.g., Alex Edmans, Blockholders and Corporate Governance 4 (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19573, 2013), available at http://www.nber
.org/papers/w19573 (discussing how blockholders engage in and affect corporate
governance).
19 See Paul H. Edelman & Randall S. Thomas, Selectica Resets the Trigger on the
Poison Pill: Where Should the Delaware Courts Go Next?, 87 IND. L.J. 1087, 1115
(2012) (discussing shareholder rights plans ("poison pills") and their effects on cor-
porations and state law).
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blocks embody the synergies of both power and control.2 ° Moreover, in
times past, while even substantial shareholders may have been gener-
ally happy to leave managers alone if they received a steady flow of
dividend income alongside appreciating share values, the emergence of
blockholders capable of dislodging Boards and managers to their ad-
vantage appears to have changed the setup considerably.2 1
The consequence has been that both Board power and share-
holder power is now split: from Boards, to Boards and managers; from
shareholders, to blockholders and all other shareholders; and from
shares with the right to vote, receive dividends, and return of paid up
capital, to shares hived of voting rights for enjoyment by another.2 2
More recently, managerial power itself has come to be split, at least
nominally, from managers to managers and Board committees. 23 Pow-
ers previously subject to managerial control if not in fact exercised by
managers, are now exercised by specialist committees consisting of a
combination of inside and outside experts with little or no control by
managers. 24 These include the appointments, audit, remuneration,
and risk management committees. 2' How these centers of power im-
pact on each other, and how they interrelate With each other, form an
integral part of the framework of corporate governance. The results of
these splits have been interesting: while the transfer of power from the
Board-manager to Board committees (answerable either directly to the
shareholder meeting or indirectly through the Board) may have weak-
ened managerial power regarding the shareholder body, the emer-
gence of blockholder power would appear to impact both Board and
shareholder power.2 6 Yet, ad hoc groupings of power may emerge as
warranted by the circumstances (e.g., between Boards and sharehold-
ers against managers (on executive compensation); managers and
Boards against shareholders (in the face of a hostile bid); managers,
Boards, and shareholders against blockholders to prevent managers
being leant on; and more importantly of blockholders and managers
20 See Thomas D. Hall, Valuing Closely Held Stock: Control Premiums and Minor-
ity Discounts, 31 EMORY L.J. 139, 147 (1982) (discussing the valuation of stock and
the incentives and motives behind such valuation.
21 See generally Edmans, supra note 18; Hall, supra note 20.
22 See generally Robert C. Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on
Investment Management Treatises, 94 HARv. L. REV. 561 (1981) (discussing the
evolution and changes to capitalism in four stages of growth).
23 Id.
24 See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United
States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 1465, 1468 (2007).
25 See id.
26 See generally Edmans, supra note 18, at 1.
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against other shareholders).2 7 The interplay of these forces highlight
the dynamic nature of the relationship between the parties-of the
tussle between strong Boards, strong managers, and dominant share-
holders such as blockholders, each bearing influence on the other-
and of the forces that emerge to constantly recast the relational dy-
namics between them. These developments no doubt have radically
transformed the nature and exercise of power sharing within the cor-
poration. As will be seen from the discussion following, the challenge
confronting corporate governance now is to address the eventuality of
managers and blockholders acting together to further their respective
interests as against the rest of the shareholder body.
II. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND MANAGEMENT EMPOWERMENT
Executive compensation in the U.S., U.K., and Australian ju-
risdictions consists of a basic fixed salary, annual bonuses tied to ac-
counting performance, long term incentive plans (i.e. restricted stock
options, multiyear accounting based performance plans and retire-
ment programs), and stock options based on the appreciation of the
firm's stock.2 8 The last component of the package-stock, and stock
options-links pay to performance by giving managers an ownership
stake in the company, and consequently a greater interest in its suc-
cess.2 9 As articulated by Jensen and Meckling, it is not how much you
pay, but how you pay.3 ° Yet, until about 1984, fewer than half of the
CEOs of listed companies even in the U.S. received stock or stock op-
tions in any given year.3 1 Following the trends set by the leveraged
buyouts of the 1980s and their flow on effects, stock options have be-
come an integral feature of executive compensation particularly as in-
centive payments, so much so that while cash remains a staple part of
27 id.
28 See, e.g., Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas F. Cooley, Executive Compensation:
Facts 2-3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15426, 2009), avail-
able at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15426; Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, CEO
Compensation 5 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16585,
2010), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16585.
29 See Frydman & Jenter, supra note 28, at 5.
30 See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 4 J. FIN. ECON.
305 (1976) (discussing the link between Jensen's theory of the firm with govern-
ance of the firm itself, and of overcoming these problems through a scheme of
targeted and structured executive compensation).
31 See Brian J. Hall, Six Challenges in Designing Equity-Based Pay, 15 J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN. 21, 22 (2003).
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the remuneration package, stock based compensation now constitutes
the bulk of the package received by executives in large corporations. 2
A question subject to much debate is whether explicit monetary
based incentive schemes are superior to those without these incentives
and, if so, what form these schemes should take.33 The concern is that
the bonus incentive culture leads to a narrowing in the cognitive focus
of managers and thus, a move away from other behavioral aspects
such as conforming to notions of reciprocity, desire for social approval,
and the challenge of fulfilling interesting tasks for its own sake-
which are all incentives traditionally perceived as being the key en-
forcers of normative managerial behavior. 34 In other words, the con-
cern is that traditional counts of normative behavior and the reward of
doing the right thing for its own sake are not only being crowded out
by the bonus stock incentive culture, but it also led to the generation of
perverse incentives for managers.3 5 While this debate is informative,
of greater concern in relation to the Anglo jurisdictions has been the
problem of gaming by managers of their compensation packages.
Managers game both the amount of the package they receive,
and the realization value of the stock based component of their pack-
ages.3 6 Gaming has been done through practices such as target based
budgeting and earnings management. 37 These practices give the ap-
pearance of stability and steady progress of the company's business
activity for which managers will be rewarded with increased compen-
sation packages, 3  enhanced job security,39 discretionary payments
even where the firm has not been a market success, and termination
payments even where this has not been provided for in their contract.
32 See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFILLED PROMISE OF EXEcUTIVE COMPENSATION 1, 7 (2004).
33 See generally Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Psychological Foundations of Incen-
tives, 46 EUR. ECON. REV. 687 (2002) (discussing the effects of various economic
incentives and concluding that monetary incentives may cause harm); Ernst Fehr
& Simon Gachter, Do Incentive Contracts Undermine Voluntary Cooperation? 1
(Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Univ. of Zurich, Working Paper No. 34,
2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=313028.
34 See, e.g., Fehr & Falk, supra note 22, at 687-88.
35 See also Nina Mazar, On Amir & Dan Ariely, The Dishonesty of Honest People:
A Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance, 45 J. MARKETING RES. 633, 642 (2008).
36 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron - A Capsule Social and Eco-
nomic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 297-98 (2004).
37 See id. at 298.
38 See, e.g., Paul M. Healy & James M. Wahlen, A Review of the Earnings Manage-
ment Literature and its Implications for Standard Setting, 13 ACCT. HORIZONS 365,
380 (1999).
39 See generally Marcia Millon Cornett, Jamie John McNutt & Hassan Theranian,
Corporate Governance and Earnings Management at Large US Bank Holding
Companies, 15 J. CORP. FIN., 412, 412 (2009).
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Evidence linking earnings management with increased managerial
compensation in the form of options and restricted options is consider-
able, especially where top management compensation is more closely
tied to the value of stock based compensation and CEOs hold large
options positions.4 ° Studies confirm that governance mechanisms
which stress CEO pay for performance encourage CEOs to manage
earnings and improve reported earnings quality, stock based option
compensation adversely affect monitoring and to cause a dramatic de-
cline in the quality of the reported earnings caused by either disguis-
ing or not revealing the nature and extent of the benefits contained in
these packages. 41 This is despite the existence of elaborate and exten-
sive disclosure rules in relation to compensation packages, for disclo-
sure can be avoided by information not being presented clearly and
understandably, or is not meaningful or responsive to disclosure
requirements.4 2
There is plentiful evidence of how gaming influences share
price, and how managers reap benefits by opportunistic realisation of
options and shares following it. A leading study on this point by Cicero
concludes as follows:
When examined in aggregate, the evidence that execu-
tives manipulate stock option exercise is not strong.
However, when exercises are separated into sub-samples
based on the exercise strategy employed, evidence of op-
portunistic behaviour emerges: Exercises accompanied
by a sale of shares are followed by negative abnormal re-
turns; exercises not accompanied by stock disposition are
preceded by a decline in stock price and followed by an
increase in stock price, such that exercise occurs at a
price trough; and exercises where the executive delivers
shares to the company are associated with abnormally
low returns immediately after exercise that turn positive
thereafter. In each of these cases, the return patterns
suggest that executives timed option exercises based on
private information to enhance their returns.4 3
40 See James Ang, Yingmei Cheng & Sarah Fulmer, Clawing Back Executive Pay
(Jan. 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors), available at http:/!
ssrn.com/astract=2139818.
41 See id. at 10-11.
42 See, e.g., John W. White, Dir., Div. of Corp. Finance, U.S. Sec. & Exch Comm'n,
Where's the Analysis, Speech by SEC Staff at the 2nd Annual Proxy Disclosure
Conference San Francisco, California (Oct. 9, 2007), available at https:/www.sec
.gov/news/speech/2007/spchlOO907jww.htm.
43 David C. Cicero, The Manipulation of Executive Stock Option Exercise Strate-
gies: Information Timing and Backdating, 64 J. FIN., 2627, 2658 (2009).
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The downside of such managed financials is that it grants the
overvalued entity access to capital priced below the normal risk-return
assessment of the marketplace with all its shortcomings.4 4 It is no sur-
prise that capital markets reacted negatively to such practices by in-
creasing the risk profile of such firms and increasing the cost of
capital, particularly debt capital to the entity.4 5 But, such responses
are at best a second-best solution with all its drawbacks in that it has
caused the stakes for managerial risk-taking, and with it, excessive
remuneration grants to be even higher-with managers awarded
greater rewards for increased risk-taking and accompanying higher
returns.
At the same time, the prevailing system under which stock
based compensation was based was found to offer managers perverse
incentives to engage in excessive risk taking,4" and in the crowding out
of what would be beneficial to the corporation in the long term by what
was favorable to it in the short term.4 7 This led to an almost exclusive
focus on share price, and as a consequence further reinforced the focus
on short-termism.4" Another problem with executive incentive
schemes was that benefits accrued from mere market-wide growth re-
gardless of whether the particular firm lagged or even lost ground to
competitors provided the share price improved; even worse was the
payment of bonuses despite declining share prices.4 9 The lack of align-
ment was exacerbated by golden- handshakes.5 ° It has also been ob-
served that problems associated with executive compensation stem
44 See Micheal C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity, 34 FIN. MGMT. 5, 10
(2005).
45 See Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Gov-
ernance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 293-96 (2012).
46 See Lucian A Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers Pay, 98 GEO.
L.J. 247, 275 (2010).
47 See Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Do Incentive Contracts Crowd Out Voluntary
Cooperation? 26 (Uni. of S. Cal. Ctr. for Law, Econs & Org., Research Paper No.
C01-3, 2001), available at http: / / papers.ssrn.com /sol3 /papers.cfm?abstractid=
229047.
48 See ROE, supra note 3.
49 See The Fascinating History of the Great British Executive Pay Boom, HAV-
INGTHEIRCAKE.cOM, http://www.havingtheircake.com/content/2_Our%20financial+
industrial%20system/5_Reward/fact%20and%20opinion/10_The%20Great%2OBrit
ish%20Executive%2OPay%2OBoom.php (last visited Mar. 14, 2015); Graham His-
cott & James Lyons, Great Bank Robbers: Bailed-Out RBS Pays £250m in Bonuses
Despite £500m Fine, MIRROR (Jan. 30, 2013), httpJ/www.mirror.co.uk/money/city-
news/bankers-bonuses-rbs-pays-250m-1562901
50 Defined as "a stipulation in an employment agreement which states that the
employer will provide a significant severance package if the employee loses their
job." Golden Handshake, INVESTOPEDIA (last visited Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.in
vestopedia.com/terms/g/golden-handshake.asp.
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from structural defects in the corporate governance structures which
enable executives to exert considerable influence over their boards;
more concerning is the observation that these structural defects tend
to weaken and distort managerial incentives and have the result of
imposing a larger cost on shareholders than the excessive compensa-
tion itself.5 1
Additionally, while the stake held by managers is very small
when compared to the totality of the modern public company's share
capital, the fact that the bulk of their compensation is in the form of
stock based compensation means that they have a much larger share
of their investment tied in with the corporation than any institutional
shareholder would. Consequently, excessive risk taking at the expense
of creditors and preference or preferred shareholders will benefit man-
agers more than other shareholders. Managers are further encouraged
by the fact that they bear little of the costs of excessive risk taking
especially where they hold a substantial amount of stock options which
offers them all the benefits of upside and little or no downside. Like-
wise, the increased cost of debt associated with stock options is yet
another downside born by all of the shareholders.5 2 The 2008 financial
crisis demonstrated how shareholders could be adversely affected by
managers taking excessive risks. 3 Consequently, the "Ulysses strat-
egy" (i.e. the imposition of constraints on managers through present
commitments on their future behavior and by precluding future op-
tions of behavior open to them) that underlies agency theory appears
not to have been sufficiently persuasive in ensuring that managers
place the interests of the corporation above their own. While there is
nothing illegal in managers extracting the best compensation package
for themselves in their bargaining with the Board, or in ensuring that
the entity's share price remains high, what is of concern is the harm
flowing from the manipulation of the entity's financials.5 4 In the face
of this, more structured and detailed requirements for disclosure of
51 See Healy & Wahlen, supra note 26, at 370-75; Michel Jensen & Kevin Mur-
phy, Remuneration: Where We've Been, How We Got to Here, What Are the
Problems, and How to Fix Them 47-48 (European Corporate Governance Inst. of
Fin., Working Paper No. 44/2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=561305.
52 See, e.g., supra note 33, at 251.
53 See John McCormack, Morgan Stanley & Judy Weiker, Rethinking "Strength of
Incentives" for Executives of Financial Institutions, 22 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., 65
(2010).
54 See, e.g., Patrick Durkin, Profits of Top Companies Come Under Surveillance,
AUSTL. Bus. INTELLIGENCE, OCT. 29, 2011, at 1, available at http://www.highbeam
.com/doc/1G1-273632626.html (reporting that "nine of the 100 biggest listed com-
panies who claimed they made a 2010-11 profit actually made a loss[ ]" according
to a report by accounting firm KPMG).
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compensation packages have been imposed. The success of such mea-
sures is of course dependent on getting managers to comply-a re-
quirement which lies at the heart of the problem.
More innovative has been the adoption of what appears to be a
two-tiered strategy. First, a shareholder vote on pay, popularly re-
ferred to as "say on pay," which requires the shareholder body at its
General Meeting to vote on the compensation packages. This has been
adopted in all three jurisdictions. The second tier of legislation differs
as between the three jurisdictions: the US and UK (as from January
2015) have adopted what is popularly known as a "clawback" provision
which enables the recovery of compensation for non-performance,
while the UK Corporate Governance Code requires Board members of
the top 350 FTSE companies to submit themselves to re-election annu-
ally, with Australia having its own version in the form of the "two-
strike" rule which may require the incumbent board to submit them-
selves to re-election. These are examined in the next Part. For conve-
nience, the term SOP trilogy is used below as a heuristic to capture the
legislative responses to address the problem of executive compensation
and corporate governance.
III. SAY ON PAY AND THE RESTORATION OF SHAREHOLDER POWER
Say on pay ("SOP") legislation, as noted, requires managerial
compensation packages to be specifically approved by shareholders at
the company Annual General Meeting. SOP has been further rein-
forced in the U.S. by laws enabling the clawback of compensation al-
ready paid out (also to come into force in the U.K. as of January 2015),
and in Australia with the two-strike rule.5 5 More importantly, the
U.K. Corporate Governance Code requires Board members of the top
350 FTSE Companies to submit themselves for re-election every
year.5 6 SOP attempts to draw on all three constituent parts of the rela-
55 See discussion infra Part III.
56 See FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 16
(2012) (providing guidelines for re-lections and stating that:
"[all directors should be submitted for re-election at regular in-
tervals, subject to continued satisfactory performance.... All di-
rectors of FTSE 350 companies should be subject to annual
election by shareholders. All other directors should be subject to
election by shareholders at the first annual general meeting after
their appointment, and to re-election thereafter at intervals of no
more than three years. Non-executive directors who have served
longer than nine years should be subject to annual re-election.
The names of directors submitted for election or re-election
should be accompanied by sufficient biographical details and any
other relevant information to enable shareholders to take an in-
formed decision on their election.... The board should set out to
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tionship triangle to ensure that managerial compensation packages
are the product of arms-length bargaining between managers and the
Board. The underlying objective of this three pronged strategy has
been to grant shareholders a voice to convey displeasure, require man-
agers to justify their compensation packages in the face of clawback,
and force Boards as ultimate gatekeepers of the corporation to take the
fall where shareholders express discontent with the compensation
packages awarded to managers. There certainly are very good reasons
for this. In the US context, Bebchuk found that in the wake of poor
performance and shareholder dissatisfaction, directors faced very little
risk of being ousted, that the shareholders' ability to replace directors
was extremely limited, and that outside the hostile takeover context,
the incidence of electoral challenges to directors as practically negligi-
ble in the past decade.5 7 These measures, however, go beyond counter-
vailing the excesses of executive compensation, to a remodelling of the
manager-shareholder balance of power, and have generated agency
problems of their own. The implications of these developments are ex-
amined below.
A. Shareholder Vote on Pay
The justification for SOP is that it provides the opportunity for
shareholders to comment on each of the components of the package e.g.
salary, bonus, retirement benefits, and perquisites. Its objective is to
ensure transparent processes and, therefore, accountability of the com-
pensation process. While the centrepiece of the strategy is the remu-
neration report,58 the information required to be disclosed varies by
jurisdiction. For example, U.S. laws require disclosure of the remuner-
ation of the five highest remunerated officers. including the CEO and
the CFO, to be made at least once every three years, while the U.K.
and Australia require disclosure of the remuneration received by all
key employees annually and has to be submitted along with the an-
nual accounts of the firm.
shareholders in the papers accompanying a resolution to elect a
non-executive director why they believe an individual should be
elected. The chairman should confirm to shareholders when pro-
posing re-election that, following formal performance evaluation,
the individual's performance continues to be effective and to
demonstrate commitment to the role.").
57 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 Bus.
LAW. 43, 44-45 (2003).
58 See, e.g., Corporations Act 2001 ss 202B, 250SA, 300A, 250R(2) (Austl.) (specify-
ing, in section 300A, the specific contents requirements of the remuneration report
and stating, in section 250R(2), what makes a shareholder vote on the remunera-
tion report a mandatory agenda item at the AGM of a listed company).
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The U.K. was the first to introduce a non-binding,5 9 advisory
vote by shareholders on executive remuneration in 2002,60 followed by
Australia in 2004,61 and the United States in 2010.62 Since October
2013, the SOP has been made binding on all stock market listed com-
panies in the U.K., but still remains persuasive only in the U.S. and
Australia. Nevertheless, the expectation, even in the two latter juris-
dictions, is that the open and public nature of the information will
force boards to implement shareholder demands. 3 There is evidence of
this; for example, in the U.S., firms that failed two consecutive votes
changed the unpopular policy, with the majority changing after one
failed vote.6 4 One study shows that of the firms surveyed in that study,
31% stated that in response to a SOP vote, and subsequent share-
holder consultations, they changed their pay practices. 5 Occidental
Petroleum and KeyCorp are examples of the success of SOP in the U.S.
These companies changed their practices following majority opposition
and in the subsequent year responded with overwhelming votes of sup-
port.6 6 Some even pre-empted the vote by changing policy with direc-
tors attempting to protect their reputations.6 7 These factors highlight
59 See generally Companies Act, 2006, § 439 (U.K.), available at http://www.legisla
tion.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/contents (inferring that as of October 2009, say on pay
vote has been made binding on all Listed Companies in the UK).
60 Id. The United Kingdom was the forerunner in mandating that shareholders be
allowed a non-binding, or advisory vote on pay. Section 439 of the UK Companies
Act mandates a vote on director pay at the yearly accounts meeting. Directors are
expected to have disclosed their remuneration package in a "Remuneration Re-
port" (section 420). Failure to do this leads to fines.
61 See Corporations Act 2001 ss 250R(2), 250R(3). The Netherlands, Norway, Swe-
den, and Denmark provide for a binding shareholder vote. See Jim Corkery &
Sabina Medarevic, Executive Remuneration Under Scrutiny: The Cutting Edge of
the 'Shareholder Spring', CORP. GOVERNANCE EJOURNAL, 1, 9 (2013), available at
http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1027&context=cgej.
This was proposed in the UK in 2011 but not implemented.
62 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank].
63 See Peter Iliev & Svetla Vitanova, The Effect of Say-on-Pay in the U.S., 1, 2 (Pa.
State Uni. Dep't of Fin., 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2235064.
64 See Symposium, Dodd-Frank's Say on Pay: Will it lead to a greater role for
shareholders in corporate governance?, 97 Cornell Law Review, 1215, 1256 (2012)
[hereinafter Thomas].
65 See id. at 2; James F. Cotter, The First Year of Say-on-Pay Under Dodd-Frank:
An Empirical Analysis and Look Forward, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 967, 982 (2013).
66 See Thomas, supra note 64, at 1259.
67 See generally Fabrizio Ferri & David Oesch, Management Influence on Inves-
tors: Evidence From Shareholder Votes on the Frequency of Pay (Columbia Bus.
Sch., Research Paper No. 13-17, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2238
999.
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effective shareholder accountability. 68 U.S. commentators observe that
SOP has "catalysed greater management attention to shareholder con-
cerns, an increased shareholder interest in voting on corporate govern-
ance, and a broader dialogue on pay issues between management and
shareholders."6 9 Similarly, U.K. commentators observe that investors
perceive it to be a value-enhancing monitoring mechanism, and useful
to pressure firms to remove controversial pay practices and increase
sensitivity of pay to poor performance.7 ° Overall, SOP appears to have,
at least in the U.S., changed the culture of firms with more perform-
ance-based measures introduced, and caused Boards to be more proac-
tive. For example, according to a 2011 survey of 834 directors, 72%
said that they would reconsider executive pay plans even if majority
support was received. 7 1 Moreover, items such as pensions, tax pay-
ments, excessive severance and perks, and paying the tax liabilities of
executives have all been subjected to closer scrutiny.7 2 Directors also
face potential liability for breaches of fiduciary duties and corporate
waste following a negative SOP vote, with U.K. data showing that
eight of the thirty-seven that received a negative vote were also sub-
jected to lawsuits.7" Corporate advisors are now required to position
the company to avoid a negative vote or defend against a lawsuit.7 4
One study summarises the U.S. position as follows:
First, we find evidence that SOP votes are sensitive to
firm risk, excessive compensation, accounting quality
and financial performance. Second, we find that boards
react to SOP rejection votes by subsequently reducing
the level of excessive compensation. Third, our results
present evidence to suggest that shareholder voting
rights-even when nonbinding-could be an effective
mechanism of corporate governance that addresses the
problem of incomplete contracts and management rent
extraction.7 5
68 Id. at 6.
69 Thomas, supra note 64, at 1256.
70 Ferri, supra note 67, at 28.
71 Thomas, supra note 64, at 1263.
72 Id. at 1257.
73 Id. at 1261.
74 Id. at 1262.
75 See Marinilka B. Kimbro & Danielle Xu, Shareholders Have a Say on Executive
Compensation: Evidence from Say-on-pay in the United States (finding statistically
that, while only 1.2 percent of the Russell 3000 failed in obtaining the requisite 50
percent approval as required under the US legislation in 2011, and 2.5% failed in
2012, 10.3 percent and 11.07 percent received more than 25% opposition or rejec-
tion votes in 2011 and 2012 respectively. Australia, it will be recalled, requires
only a 25 percent shareholder vote).
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The Australian approach has its origins in the Productivity
Commission Report, which observed, first, that incentive pay "im-
ported" from the U.S. and introduced without appropriate hurdles had
spurred pay rises in the 1990s, and that more recent complex incentive
pay may have delivered unanticipated "upside"; secondly, that some
termination payments looked excessive and indicated compliant
Boards; and thirdly, that instances of "excessive" payments and per-
ceived inappropriate behavior could reduce investor and community
trust in the corporate sector more broadly with adverse ramifications
for equity markets.7 6 The study concluded against capping pay or in-
troducing a binding shareholder vote as being impractical and costly,
emphasising instead the need to ensure Board control and accountabil-
ity.7 7 The study recommended strengthening the corporate governance
framework by removing conflicts of interest by, for example, establish-
ing independent remuneration committees and improved processes for
use of remuneration consultants, promoting Board accountability and
shareholder engagement through enhanced pay disclosure, as well as
strengthening sanctions against Boards that are unresponsive to
shareholders SOP. 78
B. Compensation Claw-back
Clawback provisions are seen as a useful tool in improving the
link between pay and performance by introducing greater accountabil-
ity because compensation is usually tied to accounting numbers or
formula results which if misstated, need to be adjusted.7 9 Clawbacks
are aimed at enabling the recovery of compensation paid erroneously,
because, in the language of pay for performance, "'what wasn't earned
must be returned."'' s In this sense, they are as much preventative as
they are remedial or punitive. As expressed in the following testimony
to the U.S. Senate Committee: "a tough claw-back policy is an essen-
tial element of a meaningful 'pay for performance' philosophy. If execu-
tives are rewarded for 'hitting their numbers'-and it turns out that
they failed to do so-they should not profit."s l
76 The Productivity Commission Inquiry Report, Executive Remuneration in Aus-
tralia, No. 49, Melbourne, Dec. 2009, at xiv.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 James S. Ang et al, Clawing Back Executive Compensation 6-8 (Midwest Fin.
Ass'n Annual Meeting Paper, 2013)), available at httpJ/dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.2139818.
80 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of the
Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647, 670 (2005).
81 See Protecting Shareholders and Enhancing Public Confidence by Improving
Corporate Governance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., & Inv. of the S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 47-48 (2009) (statement
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While the U.S. enacted the first claw-back provision in 2002 in
the form of s304 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act 2 ("SOX"), (later strength-
ened by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 20 10,83 establishing new rules relating to executive compensa-
tion), nevertheless, its scope has been truncated in many ways.8 4 The
U.K. claw-back provision comes into effect in January 2015.85 Austra-
lia has presently decided against clawback legislation. Under propos-
als forward by the previous Labor government, instead of claw-back, a"comply or explain" approach was to be adopted for misstatements
made in respect of the previous three financial years.8 1 It was felt that
claw-backs could inhibit managers from undertaking high risk, high
return investment strategies to the detriment of business and innova-
of Ann Yerger, Executive Director, Council of Institutional Investors), available at
http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.Hearing&
Hearing ID=c754606c-0b95-4139-a38a-63e63b4b3fa9.
82 Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act, H.R. 5070,
107th Cong. (2002).
83 Dodd-Frank, supra note 48.
84 For example, U.S. law requires that where a firm is required to restate its fi-
nancial statements due to "material noncompliance" with financial reporting re-
quirements under the securities laws, the company will recover from current and
former "executive officers" any "incentive-based compensation" (including any
stock option award) that is (i) based on "erroneous data," (ii) received during the
"3-year period preceding the date on which the company becomes required to pre-
pare an accounting restatement," and (iii) in excess of what would have been paid
if calculated under the restatement. See Dodd-Frank, supra note 48, § 954. As
would have been noted, the provisions only apply to CEO's and CFO's following a
restatement due to "material noncompliance" as a result of misconduct. Id. The
three year time limitation period of when a clawback provision can be used opens
up a gaping loophole in that it enables the manipulation of, if not total avoidance
of the provisions by the simple act of delaying the issuing of the restatement.
Moreover, it does not apply to indirect gains. Id.
85 U.K., HOUSE OF COMMONS TREASURY COMM., BANKING CRISIS: REFORMING COR-
PORATE GOVERNANCE AND PAY IN THE CITY 23 (2009) (containing a section that
addressed the issue of claw-backs, bonus deferral and share-based remuneration
in the banking sector. Included in this section is the exploration of a "practice of
recovering bonuses where, for example, the profits on which the bonus payment
was made turn out to be illusory or do not materialise."). The publication con-
cludes that the use of mechanisms to defer or claw-back bonus payments from
executives should be encouraged to align the interests of executives more closely
with those of shareholders. Id. at 15.
86 AUSTL. GOv.,THE CLAw-BAcK OF ExEcuTIVE REMUNERATION WHERE FINANCiAL
STATEMENTS ARE MATERIALLY MISSTATED 11 (2010), available at, http://archive
.treasury.gov.au/documents/1926/PDF/101220%2Clawback%20of%2Oexecutive%
20remuneration%20-%2OFinal%20-%2OApproved.pdf.
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tion. s7 At the same time, it recognized the effectiveness of claw-backs
in discouraging managers from taking questionable actions that may
lift stock prices in the short term, but which may ultimately result in
financial restatements.8s
C. Board Re-elections
As noted, the U.K. Corporate Governance Code requires all
Board members of Standard and Poors 350 companies to submit them-
selves for re-election every year. Australia has also implicitly accepted
that rejuvenated boards will exercise discipline following suit in a dif-
ferent form with its two-strike rule. 9 It grants shareholders the right
to vote out the Board if 25% or more votes are cast against adopting
the company's remuneration report at two successive AGMs.
Views on the effectiveness of the two-strike rule are mixed.
Supporters of the rule, like Stephen Mayne, the Research Director of
the Australian Shareholders' Association, which represents retail
shareholders, argue that the regime is having a profoundly positive
87 INVESTOR'S WORKING GROUP, CFA INST. CTR. FOR FIN. MKT INTEGRITY & COUN-
CIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: AN INvES-
TOR'S PERSPECTIVE 23 (2009), available at http://www.cfainstitute.org/ethics/
Documents/us investors working-group-report.pdf.
88 Id.
89 The application of the two-strike rule as follows:
"Th[e] Division applies in relation to a listed company if: (a) at an
AGM (the later AGM) of the company, at least 25% of the votes
cast on a resolution that the remuneration report be adopted
were against adoption of the report; and (b) at the immediately
preceding AGM (the earlier AGM) of the company, at least 25%
of the votes cast on a resolution that the remuneration report be
adopted were against adoption of the report; and (c) a resolution
was not put to the vote at the earlier AGM under an earlier ap-
plication of section 250V."
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) S 250U (Austl.). The provisions requires a listed com-
pany that has received a no vote of at least 25% shareholders (the "first strike") to
ensure that its remuneration report in the subsequent year provides an explana-
tion of the board's proposed action in response to shareholders' concerns, or an
explanation as to why no action is proposed to be taken. If the remuneration report
again receives 25% or more 'no' votes (the "second strike") at the subsequent year's
AGM, its shareholders will be permitted to vote at that AGM on whether the ex-
isting board is to be replaced and another meeting (spill meeting) held to consider
the election of directors. Id. §250V. If 50% or more shareholders vote to hold the
spill meeting, the spill meeting must be held within 90 days and all persons who
held the position of director when the remuneration report was considered will be
forced to vacate their office and stand for re-election. Id.
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effect." This is supported by a recent survey of executive pay in the
ASX100, conducted by the Australian Council of Superannuation In-
vestors ("ACSI"), finding that executive pay declined 8.9% in 2011,
largely due to decreasing bonuses.9 ' There is evidence of greater com-
pensation and performance alignment following the introduction of the
rule.92 A broader effect of the rule has been its use as a more general
way of expressing dissatisfaction with managerial decisions, 93 more
particularly, as an ousting weapon to oust company directors.9 4 Critics
argue its limited effectiveness, pointing to the ease of ensuring Board
re-election in any spill meeting called for by shareholders, due to the
significant voting power that many company Boards possess; or, for
that matter, the controlling shareholder power.9 5 Despite Boards' in-
ability to vote on their own remuneration due to conflicts of interest,
90 Two-Strike Rule, CHQA (Dec. 13, 2013), http://chqa.minterellison.com/blogcus
tom.aspx?entry=163.
91 Rachel Alembakis, ASX100 CEO Pay Bonuses Decline, THE SUSTAINABILITY RE-
PORT (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.thesustainabilityreport.com.au/asxl00-ceo-pay-
bonuses-decline/2748/.
92 For example, according to ACSI executive Byrne, corporations "had responded
to the first strike by forgoing bonuses and salary hikes and adjusting require-
ments for extra pay." Georgia Wilkins, Two-Strikes' Rule Hits Directors, THE SYD-
NEY MORNING HERALD (Oct. 8, 2012), http://www.smh.com.au/business/agm-
season/twostrikes-rule-hits-directors-20121008-278sc.html. Blue Scope Steel is an
example that has responded by "reducing overall bonuses by 67 per cent. . ." See
Cliona O'Dowd, Two Strikes' Falls Foul, BUSINESS SPECTATOR (Nov. 27, 2012),
http://www.businessspectator.com.au/article/2012/11/27/resources-and-energy/
two-strikes-falls-foul.
93 An Australian example is that of Penrice Soda Holdings, whose Chairman
David Trebeck claims that the two-strike rule was being used for "broader griev-
ances[ ]" with Penrice as Penrice's executives "hadn't been granted a pay rise for
two years. See Tim Boreham & Glenda Korporaal, Companies Agonize Over Two-
Strike Rule, THE AUSTRALIAN (Nov. 3, 2012), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/bus-
iness/companies/companies-agonise-over-two-strikes-rule/story-fn9lv9q3-1226509
479517.
94 Id.
95 The rule has also suffered from some technical defects. A matter overlooked
when the legislation was implemented was the fact that most company constitu-
tions require a nomination for an alternative board member at least 45-60 days in
advance of any spill. But under two-strike, following a spill, boards can technically
elect to hold an Extraordinary General Meeting straight away (immediately after
the AGM) so long as it is within 90 days of receiving the second strike. Linc Energy
took advantage of this legislative loophole by contemporaneously holding the spill
meeting straight after the AGM. Such a let out means that a company can ensure
that there is no genuine opportunity for dissenting shareholders to put up an al-
ternative board nomination. The requiring of a sufficient period of time between
the spill and the EGM to enable a challenger to put up an alternative board would
appear, therefore, to be necessary. See Peter Jolly, Partner & Gina Bozinovski,
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there is a bar to them using their power to re-elect current directors
once a spill has occurred. Australian examples include Linc Energy9 6
and Cabcharge which used their "majority share holdings to avoid a
board spill."97 Similarly, Hill and Isherwood indicated that they would
use their influence in Globe International to "re-elect the existing di-
rectors," 8 as have Linc Energy.9 9 Another example is that of James
Packer quoted as saying that he would use his 46% shareholding "in
the casino operator to... reinstate every board member if' there were
re-elections as a result of the two-strike rule.1 0 0 Such criticisms,
though valid with respect to companies with substantial shareholders
in control, would be irrelevant in respect of the large corporation with
dispersed shareholdings. A point has also been made of the additional
costs associated with holding a spill meeting, and of executives prepar-
ing for a spill meeting, °10 though this is also true of all shareholder
originated actions, a notable example being the shareholder derivative
action.
Several observations need to be made at this point. The first is
that mandating Boards to submit themselves to election either annu-
ally or subject to a strike requirement helps overcome the coordination
problem endemic to entities with disparate shareholdings, and the dif-
ficulties associated with access to the corporate proxy voting machin-
ery.1 0 2 Second, the use of rented votes or empty voting (i.e. in the
separation of voting rights from the economic interest in shares, with
blockholders acquiring the right to vote only, but not the downside of
negative movements in the price of the stocks over which voting rights
have been acquired), helps blockholders acquire a strategic controlling
vote in the entity cheaply, effectively, and discreetly.'o 3 Third, the fact
that many investors do not vote helps further strengthen the influence
Two Strikes Rule - Playing by the Rules, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 30, 2013), http:ll
www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=bcc534ff-c2dl-410f-a140-780837fD4977.
96 O'Dowd, supra note 92.
97 Mathew Smith, Penrice Soda Directors Survive First Ever Two-Strike Spill,
BRW. (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.brw.com.au/p/leadership/penricesoda-directors
-survivefirst FhuyeT7iM6M7mRlvXrJbTK..
98 O'Dowd, supra note 92.
99 Id.
100 James Frost, Sevior Backs Executive Two-Strike Pay Tule, THE AuSTRALIAN
(Oct. 29, 2011), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/companies/sevior-
backs-executive-two-strikes-pay-rule/story-fn9lv9q3-1226179957662.
101 Cf Id.
102 Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 815-16 (2006).
103 Id.
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of blockholders in the entity.1 ° 4 While such a strategy makes good
sense in the context of the recent history of executive compensation, it
overlooks the likelihood of the gamekeeper (manager) and the monitor
(blockholder) together acting as poachers of corporate property. In
other words, SOP legislation has had the curious effect of not only
strengthening the power of blockholders, but of also creating opportu-
nities for managers to act in concert with blockholders against the rest
of the shareholder body. Corporate governance has come full circle:
just as much as stock based incentive compensation which was in-
tended to overcome the shareholder-manager incentive problem begot
its own agency problems (unintended though this may have been), the
SOP strategy of strengthening blockholder power has generated in its
wake its own set of agency problems-the likelihood of blockholders
and shareholders acting in concert against the rest of the general
shareholder body. These observations are elaborated below.
IV. FROM INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER PASSIWTY
TO BLOCKHOLDER HYPERACTIVITY
Institutional investor power was once seen as the force through
which recalcitrant managers could be brought to account, their invest-
ment showed that their predominant interest was to protect and pre-
serve the interests of their own investor constituency than in setting
right the entities in which they invested. More simply, their concern
was to ensure the security and capital appreciation of their invest-
ment, with an eye to liquidity, requiring them to balance ease of exit
(to ensure liquidity) with the benefits of exercising control (participat-
ing in the management of their investee entities). Consequently, inter-
ventions by them in the affairs of the corporations they invested in
were rare, and undertaken only when needed to protect their particu-
lar investments.1 05 The emergence of blockholders as managerial dis-
ciplinarians and facilitators of control has radically transformed this
picture of institutional passivity.
Blockholder success is attributable to a number of factors that
have coalesced together. These include the availability of investment
funds, the ability of investment vehicles to specifically target and ob-
tain funds from wealthy investors free of disclosure and reporting reg-
ulations, freedom of fund managers to invest these funds at their
discretion, their ability to tie these funds in for periods of time, passiv-
ity on the part of institutional investors, changes to the 1992 proxy
04 Cf. Susan E.K. Christoffersen et al., Vote Trading and Information Aggrega-
tion 2-3 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 141/2007,
2007).
105 John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor As Cor-
porate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1311 (1991).
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regulations in the U.S., the growth of commercial shareholder advisory
firms, and financial innovation which helped develop the practice of
empty voting.10 6 Pension and mutual funds, for example, have been
able to aggregate the savings of millions of individuals into enormous
investment portfolios in the three jurisdictions, with all of these funds
taking stakes in investment and hedge funds, the mainstay of
blockholder activity. 107 Moreover, changes to proxy regulations in the
U.S. in 1992 enabled pension, mutual, and hedge funds to combine to-
gether and vote as a single large voting block. The change also made it
possible for these investment funds to communicate with each other as
well as with other shareholders their views on corporate policy. An-
other contributing factor has been the growth of commercial share-
holder advisory firms such as Institutional Shareholder Services
("ISS") specializing in advising pension and mutual funds on how to
vote the proxies of the shares held in their investment portfolios.10 8
These advisory services help coordinate the voting policies of many dif-
ferent institutional investors into one voting block controlled by the
advisory service itself, reducing the collective action problem associ-
ated with widely dispersed shareholdings. Furthermore, the growth of
financial innovation in the form of debt and equity hybrids, options
and SWAP derivatives, and the shorting of borrowed shares along with
a corresponding call option to hedge the underlying exposure taken
have all contributed to putting corporations into play. As investment
in hedge funds is limited to wealthy investors, they fall outside the
ambit of seeking funds from the general public, and as a consequence
lightly regulated.1 0 9 Moreover, the absence of need for a diversified in-
vestment portfolio has made it easier for hedge fund managers to take
concentrated positions that impact on the market, thereby increasing
the counterparty risk exposure of the hedge fund to the particular
transaction. Hedge funds have found an ideal investment paradise in
this environment, despite the many publicised debacles. 1
Moreover, the hedge fund practice of using multiple brokers to
invest their fund monies ensures that no single broker will have the
whole picture. Also, the fact that the stress tests and other tools used
by a prime broker to monitor counterparty risk profile apply only in
106 See generally Franklin Edwards, Hedge Funds and the Collapse of Long Term
Capital Management, 13 J. EcON. PERSP., 189, 193, 197 (1999); David Shirreff,
Lessons From the Collapse of Hedge Fund, Long term Capital management, (Int'l
Fin. Risk Inst., 1999), available at http://emiab.berkeley.edu/users/webfac/craine
e137_f03/137lessons.pdf.
107 See Edwards, supra note 91, at 193-94.
108 See Stephen J. Choi, Director Elections and the Role of Proxy Advisors, 82 S.
CAL. L. REV. 649, 650-51 (2009).109 Id. at 190-91.
110 Id. at 193.
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relation to transactions dealt with by that particular broker means
that the full extent of the risks involved cannot be known. The result is
that hedge funds are able to externalize their risks beyond the inves-
tors in the fund and on to the regulated market (prime brokers, banks,
and their shareholders), to other market players, and to the commu-
nity generally."' Consequently, there have been calls for the regula-
tion of hedge funds in the U.S., the European Union ("E.U."), and in
Australia. Calls in the U.S. have been prompted by concerns of market
integrity and systemic risk flowing from the exemptions and exclu-
sions from the federal securities laws that permitted a private market
in securities to thrive in ways that may have harmed the public mar-
kets.1 1 2 Calls in the E.U. have been sparked by the need to curb the
activism of these funds, as well as associated practices such as empty
voting. Against this, however, those favoring investment fund activism
see such activity as promoting shareholder democracy and generating
managerial efficiency.1 13
When seen in the context of the changes to the corporate scene
that investment funds can bring about, concerns over making the SOP
vote binding (as in the U.K.), of clawbacks (as in the U.S., and in the
U.K. as from January 2015), and Boards being required to submit
themselves for re-election are easier to comprehend. These changes
not only arm shareholders with very potent weapons to keep Boards in
control, but also to help overcome the lack of coordination problem en-
demic to large shareholder bodies. More to the point, these changes
confer enormous power on blockholders, as they enable them to inter-
vene effectively and strategically in the management and governance
of the large corporation.
In discussing the U.S. scene, well known corporate lawyer and
author Martin Lipton has observed that "attacks by activist hedge
funds" constitutes the number one key issue for directors." 4 This is
understandable in light of what hedge funds can do to instil fear in
managers.'1 5 Yet, the question remains as to what exactly it is that
111 Edwards, supra note 106, at 195-200; Shirreff, supra note 106, at 5.
112 See Luis A. Aguilar, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n., Hedge Fund Regulation
on the Horizon - Don't Shoot the Messenger, Address at Hedgeworld Fund Ser-
vices Conference, New York (June 18, 2009), available at www.sec.gov/news/
speech /2009/spchO61809laa.htm [hereinafter Aguilar].
113 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 14, at 1026 (citing Battling for Corporate
America, ECONOMIST, Mar. 09, 2006, at 69, 69-71).
114 Kahan & Rock, supra note 14 at 1026 (citing Client Memorandum from Martin
Lipton, Watchell, Rosen & Kats, Attacks by Activist Hedge Funds (Mar. 7, 2006)
(on file with author)).
115 Binsted, supra note 16, at 28 (quoting Australian lawyer Jeremy Leibler who
stated that "'Directors are really worried about this. In shareholder activist scena-
rios, unlike other legal actions, it has less to do with the success of winning the
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blockholders deliver. For example, Bratton 1 6 observes that U.S.
"hedge funds prove better at extracting target concessions and getting
into boardrooms than at yielding long-term, market-beating financial
gain" and that "[o]verall the hedge funds' talents appear best suited to
address matters that can be interrogated from outside the target,"
such as cash disgorgements and asset sales which can be gauged from
publicly available information, than with value creating initiatives
such as reducing operating costs which require "hands on confronta-
tion" based on information available from the inside with the results
yielding no overall evidence of constructive input at this level." 7 Brat-
ton, for example, has found that in the US: 1 8
[A]ctivist intervention led to something tangible in 88
percent of the cases, whether an asset sale, a stepped up
cash payout, a board seat, or a legislative concession...
[while] only a minority of the targets' stock prices beat
market indices over the period of engagement, with fi-
nancial underperformance being particularly notable in
cases where the hedge fund entered the target
boardroom. 119
More to the point is that if blockholders are able to lean on
managers to do their bidding, it follows that managers will act to
please blockholders in order to safeguard their position within the cor-
poration (employment contract, stock based incentive compensation
and the like). The emergence of a coalition of interests between man-
agers and blockholders will in these circumstances be inevitable.
Given this, the opportunity to cause harm to the corporation and to the
rest of the shareholders from potential self-dealing by both
blockholders and managers, albeit by another name (e.g. share buy
backs, special dividends, sale of assets or even the entire firm),' 2 ° will
be immense. There is an interesting parallel here between managerial
gaming of their compensation packages assisted by compliant Boards,
and blockholder exploitation of their rented control positions assisted
by compliant managers: both harm the corporation; more so, in the
action and more to do with psychology and perception'... 'Activists target direc-
tors. As soon as they tip the scales beyond what directors expect they will be ex-
posed to it will change the way directors act.'").
116 William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets: Long-Term Re-
sults 1-2 (Uni. of Pa. Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 10-17, 2008)
117 Id.
118 Id. The study takes a second look at a database of 114 activist hedge fund
investments between 2002 and December 31, 2006, published in 2007, and an up-
dated database from January 2007 to June 2009.
119 Bratton, supra note 116, at 2.
120 See Anabtawi & Stout supra note 1, at 1279.
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latter situation where managers decide to go along with blockholder
demands. Even if it can be said that the overall effect of managers
doing the bidding of blockholders will result in a trickle down of bene-
fits to the rest of the shareholder body, the question still arises
whether transfers of control transactions through rented control
should be subject to regulation. Moreover, the fact that rented control
is a new phenomenon falling within the bounds of existing law does
not mean that the matter should be left there; rather, it means that its
causes and concerns should be freshly looked at and where necessary
new forms of addressing the problems they gives rise to should be
considered.
V. RECONSIDERING MANAGEMENT AND BLOCKHOLDER POWER
The discussion in this article so far looked at how the current
SOP legislation has resulted in a redistribution of power as between
managers, Boards, and shareholders. Moreover, the rebalancing has
been not so much by way of a reduction of managerial powers, as from
the attempted imposition of greater accountability on managers to
Boards and shareholders, and improved shareholder coordination.
This Part examines whether the empowerment of blockholder power
caused by this rebalancing (whether or not intended) impacts nega-
tively on managers and other shareholders, and if so how, and which
aspect of it should be addressed. Three issues are canvassed in this
context: First, the problems presented by rented or empty voting; sec-
ondly, whether the premium received for transfer of control should be
accountable to the corporation; and thirdly, whether blockholder
power should be made accountable.
A. Rented or Empty Voting
It is trite knowledge that shares embody three entitlements,
namely, the right to vote, to dividends when declared, and to a return
of capital in the event of liquidation. All such entitlements are by ref-
erence to each class of shares, and are prorated by-reference to each
share. The practice has grown by which each of these entitlements is
packaged as a commodity in its own right and rented out separately,
enabling its holder to momentarily exercise the legal claims attached
to it, whether of the right to vote, or to dividend. The transfer of rights
under these contracts is for a very limited period (may even be limited
to a specific purpose), alongside the undertaking by the transferor to
buyback the asset. In other words, the transaction has more the char-
acteristics of a lease than a sale. During its duration, there is the spec-
tre of different claimants to the right to vote and to dividends,
alongside the lessor as residual owner of these rights. For corporations
and tax law purposes, the name entered on the corporate register at a
particular reference date is conclusive of the matter. Reputedly, the
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rights under these shares are leased out for a fee without the knowl-
edge of the owners of these shares by the brokers and institutional
investors entrusted with its custody as part of their business and in-
vestment activity. Estimates are that acquirers obtain these entitle-
ments very cheaply, 12 1 and without exposure to the downside of a drop
in value of the share itself for the period of the exercise of the right. 122
Empty voting can be resorted to by blockholders, as well as
managers and Boards (in addition to their use of the proxy machin-
ery).12 3 While blockholders use it to facilitate transfers of control,
managers and Boards may use it to effect a managerial buyout, or the
leveraged buyout of another corporation, or for use simply as a defen-
sive strategy in the face of a hostile bid in jurisdictions where the tak-
ing of defensive actions are not prohibited. Thus, it takes the form of a
two-edged sword having the potential to destroy the purported man-
ager-shareholder power on a massive scale. In all, at least four scena-
rios can be contemplated in the use of empty voting:
(1) Blockholder use of it to facilitate the transfer of control;
(2) Target managers and blockholder use of it to facilitate
transfer of control;
(3) Target managers use it to engage in defensive actions, un-
less prohibited (as under the U.K. City Code Rules);
(4) Target managers and Board use it to engage in a manage-
ment buyout, leveraged buyout.
Clearly, the practice has a negative impact on corporate gov-
ernance as it weakens the dependence-independence strategy of gov-
ernance. More to the point is that managers (and Boards for that
matter) when placed in a vulnerable position will seek allies, the most
readily available of which are blockholders. Its very existence flies in
the face of the clamour for institutional shareholders to facilitate
greater managerial accountability to the shareholder body.
121 See Mark Hulbert, One Borrowed Share, But One Very Real Vote, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 16, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/16/business/yourmoney/16stra
.html. Hulbert states, "As long as you have the collateral, borrowing shares is very
inexpensive. The annual cost can be as low as 20 basis points, or two-tenths of a
percentage point, on the cash that is put up. And because the borrower must hold
the shares for just one day in order to have voting rights, the interest can be al-
most nothing. The cost to borrow $1 million of stock for one day, for example, could
be less than $6.00."
122 Id.
123 See generally William L. Tolbert, Jr., Leslie H. Lepow, & John F. Cox, Briefly:
Borrowed Voting, (AEI Legal Center for the Public Interest) (vol. 11 no. 8 2008)
available at http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/20080515-Brieflyvii
n8_web.pdf.
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B. Premiums on Controlling Votes
The argument that premiums received for transfer of control-
ling interests should be made accountable to the corporation have been
justified on the grounds that (1) transfers of control amount to an ap-
propriation of a corporate opportunity, 12 4 (2) the control premium is a
corporate asset,125 (3) shareholders owe a fiduciary obligation to non-
controlling shareholders,1 26 and (4) sharing of the premium based on
the inherent principle of equal opportunity in corporation law. Of
these, the equal opportunity justification has had the highest traction
and is now firmly enshrined in corporate takeovers law generally. The
claim that the sale of control amounts to the transfer of a corporate
opportunity has had no reception at all in the courts of any of the juris-
dictions discussed in this article. It has been criticised on the ground
that it is hard to spell out any opportunity of the corporation taken
advantage of by the seller of control. 1 27 From the buyer's perspective,
it is no more than the case of the stock being more valuable to the
buyer than to anyone else provided that control passed with it. The
claim of control as a corporate asset is based on the ground that control
is in itself not a property right, but a power position which is "adventi-
tious" and which among other things, enables the controller to appoint
the board. The argument is that controlling stock comprises of its in-
vestment value and an appurtenant power of control. And unlike
stockholders, directors, however chosen, have to act according to their
honest business judgment and in the best interests of the corporation.
As stated by Berle:
The position of a majority shareholder, with his capacity
to control, is thus not a 'property right' in the same sense
as his right to participate in dividends, or in liquidation
or the like. His control power is really adventitious, a by-
product of the corporate capacity to choose a board of di-
rectors by less than unanimity. This is why the control
power - capacity to choose a management - is a corpo-
rate asset, not an individual one.'12
124 See Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property, 337-38 (1932).
125 Id.
126 See generally Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co., 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969) (holding
defendant controlling shareholders had a fiduciary duty not to abuse their power
to control the corporation to the detriment of the minority shareholders).
127 See William D. Andrews, Stockholders Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale
of Shares, 78 HARv.L. REV. 505, 517 (1965).
128 Adolf A. Berle, The Price of Power: Sale of Corporate Control, 50 CORNELL L.
REV. 628, 638 (1965).
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Framed differently, the claim is that control shares will not be
worth as much if the rights of the minority must be respected (i.e. the
premium has to be shared between all shareholders). Berle supple-
ments this theory in a later article he published, adding that control:
[I]s no longer solely an attribute of stock ownership,
though stock ownership plays a part. It is no longer
merely a definable portion of the bundles of rights held
by stockholders, whether separable or inseparable from
the stock itself. It is not a 'thing' but a function.., with
substantial public responsibilities.' 2 9
In the U.S., the early case of Jones v. Ahmanson recognized an
unrestricted fiduciary obligation on majority stockholders in the sale
of control situations, though the corporation itself had suffered no
harm. It has not been received into the U.K. or Australian law, and
has not had much traction even in the U.S. outside of California. l a°
The equal opportunity theory advocated by Jennings' 3 ' has been de-
veloped mainly by Andrews." a2 Andrews rejects the corporate asset
theory on grounds that it focuses on the buyer rather than the seller,
and that the focus should be on the seller for the premium received. 133
What is violated in a sale of control situation is the right of all share-
holders to have an equal opportunity to participate rateably in the sale
of stock pursuant to an offer to purchase control. 14 The equal opportu-
nity rule neither compels nor prohibits a sale of stock at any particular
price.1 35 Nor does it compel a prospective purchaser to make an open
offer for all of the shares in the company on the same terms.1 3 6 The
only requirement is that the offer be made equally or proportionately
available to all stockholders. 1 7 The equal opportunity theory seeks to
achieve the same result as the corporate asset theory (i.e., both seek to
ensure that non-controlling shareholders are not excluded from a sale
129 Adolf A. Berle, Jr., "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1215
(1958).13o Jones v. Ahmanson, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 599 (Cal. 1969).
131 See Richard W. Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CALIF. L. REV 1,
16-17 (1956).
132 William D. Andrews, The Shareholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale
of Shares, HARv. L. REV. 505, 516-17 (1965).
133 Id.
134 The leading case on the subject is the US case of Perlman v. Feldman. 219 F.2d
173, 178 (1955) (analyzing the sale by a shareholder of a controlling shareholder
interest to an outside third party. The relief granted was to require an accounting
directly to non-participating shareholders for the premium received by the seller of
control).
135 Andrews, supra note 132, 516.
136 Id.
137 Id.
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of shares to a new controller).1 3 s They differ in that while the corpo-
rate asset theory attempts to prevent the controller from retaining all
the premium, the equal opportunity theory allows the minority share-
holders to sell their shares, or at least as great a proportion as the
controllers sell, and at the same price. 139 It also allows the minority
shareholders to opt out of the enterprise if they fear oppression or self-
dealing of the corporation by the new controllers. 140 Thus, the equal
opportunity theory goes further than the corporate asset theory as far
as minority shareholders are concerned, and the equal opportunity
justification can be seen as representing the flip-side of corporate law's
notion that each class of shares has the same rights as any other share
of that class, namely, equal right to vote, dividends, and return of capi-
tal upon liquidation.1 4 1 In this sense, the rule simply seeks to ensure
an equal right of exit to all shareholders in transfer of control situa-
tions. Accordingly, the rule has become an integral part of the take-
overs law in Australia, the U.K., and U.S.1 4 2 Perhaps then it may be
appropriate to consider whether transactions facilitating corporate
control be subject to greater scrutiny than they are at present.
C. Blockholder Power and its Accountability
In discussing blockholder accountability, it is necessary to dis-
tinguish the ends from the means of ensuring managerial and Board
accountability.1 4 3 Unlike the former, the latter has been much con-
tested. The concerns expressed in this article, therefore, are not about
the former-managers and Boards being accountable to the share-
holder body-but rather about the role played by blockholders.
138 Id. at 528.
139 Id. at 527.
140 Id. at 551.
141 Id. at 522.
142 These rules, embodied in the Australian takeover laws and contained origi-
nally in the Companies (Acquisition of Shares) Act 1980 (Cth) (Austl.). They follow
the recommendations of The Eggleston Committee, and are referred to as the Eg-
gleston Rules. See generally AUST., Co. LAw ADVISORY Comm., REPORT TO THE
STANDING COMMI'T'rEE OF ATTORNEYS-GENERAL ON DISCLOSURE OF SUBSTANTIAL
SHAREHOLDINGS AND TAKEOVERS (1969), available at http://www.parliament.vic
.gov.au/papers/govpub/VPARL1968-69NoCl.pdf. On the U.K., see generally John
Armour & David A. Skeel, Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why?
The Peculiar Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation, 95 GEo.L.J. 1727
(2007); and for a comparative study see Jennifer G. Hill, Takeovers, Poison Pills
and Protectionism in Comparative Corporate Governance (European Corporate
Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 168/2010, 2010), available at httpJ/ssrn
.com/abstract=1704745.
143 See generally WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ, TAKEOVER LAW AND PRACTICE
128 (2014).
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Blockholder success is attributable to their ability to access large
amounts of funds tied in for a period of time to be deployed on targets
of their choosing. 144 More importantly, their success is attributable to
the fact that they have been able to reconcile the conflicting demands
of control and exit, which has been the bugbear of institutional inves-
tors. Blockholders buy to sell (not as part of an investment portfolio),
and strike strategically to have their preferences given effect to, and/or
bring about transfers of corporate control. 14 Their very presence puts
corporate managers on notice. 146 While they have ostensibly filled the
governance role once expected of institutional investors, there remain
concerns about the way they acquire the ability to transfer control
(renting of power through empty voting), their disinterest in the well-
being of the target entity itself by their having little if any skin in the
game (minimal equity stake), their ability to engage in self-dealing,
ability to lean on target managers to do their bidding, to receive premi-
ums on the transfer of control, and for their lack of accountability to
the general shareholder body of their target corporations or for that
matter to the shareholder body of any public corporation. 14 7 At best,
their accountability is to a small coterie of investors in the funds they
manage. The last point highlights an underlying tension between the
goals of corporation law and finance theory. While corporation law
sees the corporation as a legal entity answerable for its legal actions,
and its officers answerable to its internal constituency through layers
of accountability by way of the AGM and internal and external compli-
ance processes, financial markets see the corporation as being regu-
lated by the marketplace through the capital, managerial, and
144 See generally id. at 4.
145 Id. at 6, 56-60.
146 A recent example is the role of how a substantial shareholder was able to ex-
tract collateral benefits for the shares he held in a second company, under a take-
over scheme of arrangement for another company in which he also held shares
(the benefit amounted to nearly A$ 200 million for a shareholding of 11.8% in the
second company). Woolworths (South Africa) held 87.88% of shares in Country
Road (an Australian company), while Solomon Lew (the shareholder in question)
held 11.8% of its shares. Upon Woolworths announcing a bid for David Jones (an-
other Australian company), Lew bought in 9.9% of David Jones shares, and an-
other 12% voting control (rented control coupled with appropriate hedging
contracts) and threatened to block the bid by Woolworths for David Jones. Wool-
worths bought over Lew's shares in Country Road at a premium of A$17 per share
(netting Lew nearly A$200 million on the transaction), and bought out all of the
shares in David Jones, including those of Mr Lew. See generally Memorandum
from Melissa Hennessy, Gen.Counsel. & Assistant Sec'y, Country Road Group, to
ASX Market Announcements, Austrl. Sec. Exch. (July 21, 2014), available at http:/
/member.afraccess.com/media?id=CMN://3A408887&filename=20140721/CTY_01
534815.pdf.
147 See WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ, supra note 128, at 6-8.
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takeovers market where the overall result is captured in its share
price. It is for this reason that corporation law sees the protection of
minority shareholders rights and transfers of control as ends in them-
selves and requiring regulatory control, whereas finance theory sees it
as items of property rights to be traded.
Commentators favoring the emergence of blockholders see it as
a useful countervailing force against recalcitrant managers that also
ensures Board independence from managers while increasing Board
dependence on shareholders. Bebchuk claims that previously, direc-
tors in the U.S. faced very little risk of being ousted in the wake of poor
performance and shareholder dissatisfaction, that shareholder ability
to replace directors was extremely limited, and that outside the hostile
takeover context, the incidence of electoral challenges to directors as
being practically negligible in the past decade.1 4 Those opposed to in-
creased shareholder power, however, see this development as over-
turning the balance of power within the corporation, and
counterproductive. Even if it be the case that the emergence of
blockholder power has helped resolve the separation problem as
framed by Berle and Means, and has the useful result of making man-
agers more accountable, opportunistic behavior by blockholders may
be as detrimental, if not more, to the rest of the shareholder body as is
with managerial opportunism. 149 More to the point is that protago-
nists on both sides of the argument fail to give adequate attention to
the real problem facing corporate governance: this is the emergence of
a blockholder-manager coalition of interests and their acting to benefit
themselves at the expense of the rest of the shareholder body.
To explain further, it is necessary to remember that
blockholder fund managers are confronted with double and multiple
agency problems. This flows from the fact that blockholder managers
rely on the investment skills of specialists outside their organizations
to invest on their behalf. Moreover, even in a best case scenario of a
single agency situation, since the prime obligation of blockholders is to
those that have entrusted them with funds for investment,
blockholders would rationally act to further the interests of their own
constituency. Likewise, managers of the target or investee corporation
faced with the prospect of termination will act to save their positions,
or at least get the best deal possible for themselves in the circum-
stances. Hence the temptation for blockholders and target managers to
148 Bebchuk, supra note 32, at 43-44.
149 There is also ample evidence which suggest that such gains as are made by
shareholders come at the expense of creditor and employee entitlements. See, e.g.,
Allaire & Firsirotu, Hedge Funds as Activist Shareholders: Passing Phenomenon
or Grave-Diggers of Public Corporations? (Jan. 27, 2007), available at http:II
ssrn.com/abstract=961828.
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act together to further their respective interests as against the rest of
the investors in the target company is very great, with the consequent
harm to the target entity in these circumstances being considerable. It
is this which needs safeguarding against. The point is underscored in
an article by Coffee on institutional investors, where he refers to shift-
ing coalitions being forever present in corporate governance.15 0 Al-
though he makes that observation in the context of defensive actions
in the face of hostile takeover bids, its logic applies equally aptly to the
developments in corporate governance discussed in this article. In
other words, the downside of blockholder activity must be seen as be-
ing of equal concern alongside whatever upside it must deliver. Seeing
blockholder activity purely in terms of a countervailing force to mana-
gerial agency problems which should be encouraged, ignores not only
the agency problems that blockholder activity generates, but also over-
looks the cumulative impact of the manager-blockholder coalition.
This raises the important question of what it is that the re-
quirement that board members submit themselves to re-election annu-
ally or biannually is intended to achieve: whether it is intended to
ensure that the sentiments expressed in the shareholder vote in rela-
tion to executive compensation are given effect to, or to make board
replacement generally easier? If the former, then a binding share-
holder vote would on the face of it appear to suffice; if the latter, then
the issue of whether defensive strategies should be made available
should be considered. 51 The question assumes considerable signifi-
cance in light of blockholder power to dictate managerial actions. The
point is underscored in the following observation by Bratton and
Wachter:
[Slhareholder empowerment delivers management a
simple and emphatic marching order: manage to max-
imise the market price of the stock. This is exactly what
the managers of a critical set of financial firms did in re-
cent years. They managed to a market that focused on
increasing observable earnings, and as it turned out,
150 Coffee, supra note 105, 1367.
151 RULE 21 of The UK Takeover Code prohibits managers from taking any action
which may frustrate the bid ("frustrating action") without the approval of share-
holders in general meeting. PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE TAKEOVER
CODE (2013), available at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/up
loads/2008/ll/code.pdf. The provisions of the Code are now part of UK Company
Law. s28 Companies Act, 2006, c. 46 §28 . The Code is the basis of EU Takeover
Law following Directive 2004/25/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of April 21, 2004 on Takeover Bids. The US counterpart is the Williams Act
1968, which amends the Securities Exchange Act 1934. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-
(e), 78n(d-(f) (1976) (adding §§ 13(d-(e), 14(d)-(f) to Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(1934 Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976)).
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they failed to factor in concomitant increases in risk that
went largely unobserved. The fact that management
bears primary responsibility for the disastrous results
does not suffice to effect a policy connection between in-
creased shareholder power and sound regulatory
reform. 152
These observations when transplanted to a situation where
blockholders act in concert with managers appear to seriously jeopard-
ize the manager-shareholder power balance envisaged in the large
modern corporation of today.
CONCLUSION
This article highlights how the contest for power and influence
within the corporation has moved from the domain of Boards, manag-
ers, institutional investors, to influence wielded by blockholders, and
to blockholders acting in concert with managers. Hostile takeover bids,
despite their excesses, can perform the role of a useful marketplace
disciplinarian of corporate managers. However, its feasibility depends
on its being facilitated by arbitrageurs, institutional investors, and
now blockholders. While blockholder power is useful in this sense and
should be welcome, it also has the downside of self-dealing, lack of ac-
countability, and of power over the shareholder body without really
being a shareholder. One of the cardinal messages from agency theory
is that the entity's interests are best furthered by those who have skin
in the game. It is for this reason that agency theory based executive
compensation advocates the use of stock based compensation. By im-
plication, therefore, those engaged in rented control as much as those
who rent out shares (brokers and institutional investors) would rarely
if at all see their personal wellbeing as being synonymous with the
wellbeing of the target entity.
There has been a vigorous discussion on the subject of the
shareholder-manager balance of power especially in the U.S. Yet, the
bulk of these discussions focus mainly on the shareholder-manager
power divide, and ignore the more important aspect of the conse-
quences of controlling groups, ostensibly part of the general share-
holder body, acting to further their own interests. This is evident, for
example, in the contributions by Martin Lipton1" 3 (countering the in-
crease of shareholder power, at the expense of board power, and in
152 William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Em-
powerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 654 (2010).
153 Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom 35 Bus. LAW. 101
(1979).
124 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 14:1
relation to takeover defences) and Bebchuk and Fried.5 4 (for board in-
dependence from executives, in the context of executive compensation
accountability). Earlier in time even Arrow15 5 saw the Board-share-
holder relationship as a zero sum game where an increase in share-
holder power meant a diminution of Board power. Likewise, even
Lipton's observations on the then emerging role of arbitrageurs and
hedge funds as speculators rather than investors 5 6 viewed hedge
funds in the context of Board power, and not as impacting on share-
holder power itself. Important as these contributions are, they seem to
view the emergence of blockholder power as an extension of share-
holder power generally. It is here that the more recent contributions
by Gilson and Gordon,' 5 7 and Anabtawi and Stout 158 bear special rele-
vance to the discussion.
Gilson and Gordon argue for a balancing out of the roles played
by mutual and pension funds on the one hand, and hedge funds on the
other for the benefit of capital markets. 159 While accepting that mu-
tual funds and pension funds tend to be passive investors not engaged
in initiating important proposals, they argue that by encouraging
them to serve as governance intermediaries in respect particularly of
proposals initiated by shareholder activists such as hedge funds would
result in increased benefits all around.'6 ° This, they claim would act
"to potentiate institutional investor voice, to increase the value of the
vote, and thereby to reduce the agency costs" that they identify in the
intermediation process by financial intermediaries. 6 ' It still remains
though that pension funds and mutual funds, like hedge funds, may
not be interested in the welfare of the investee corporation for its own
sake, but as an avenue to further the interests of their own investor
constituency, and this precisely is the problem presented by invest-
ment fund activity. 16 2 In other words, their proposal overlooks the ele-
ment of self-dealing by blockholders, especially by investment and
hedge funds. While corporation law has a long history of containing
self-dealing by Board members and managers, self-dealing by
154 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of
the Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647; see also Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The Many
Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 733 (responding to Bebchuk).
155 KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 78 (1974).
156 Lipton, supra at note 114.
157 See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of
Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights,
113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 869 (2013).
158 See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 1.
159 Gilson & Gordon, supra note 142, at 868-69.
160 Id. at 876.
161 Id. at 864.
162 Id. at 896.
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blockholders 163 has been spared such accountability. Anabtawi and
Stout"' meet this problem squarely and argue for a comprehensive
theory of accountability for pension and investment funds through the
imposition of a fiduciary duty on them, given the ability of these new
controllers to lever Boards and executives to their way of thinking.
Under the proposal, investment funds are to be subject to the fiduciary
obligations of loyalty and good faith where they are found to "control"
the corporation (i.e. where a particular shareholder can formally or in-
formally influence corporate behavior with respect to a particular is-
sue from which that shareholder will stand to derive a pecuniary gain
to which other shareholders are not).165 Such a requirement would be
particularly useful to ensure the welfare of the general shareholder
body in the situation facing corporate governance at present.
There have been some interesting developments on investment
and institutional shareholder power in the U.K. The Stewardship
Code 16 6 brought out by the U.K. Financial Review Council in 2010,
sets out good governance practices for institutional investors 167 based
on a set of principles which require institutional investors to declare
how they will discharge their stewardship responsibilities; have a ro-
bust policy on managing conflicts of interest in relation to their stew-
ardship role; monitor their investee companies; state when and how
they will escalate their stewardship duties; act collectively with other
investors where appropriate; have a clear policy on voting and disclo-
sure of voting activity; and report periodically on their stewarding and
voting activities. 161 Institutional investors are regarded as stewards
under the Code and are urged to actively monitor and engage with
their investee corporation. 169 The Code also requires institutional in-
vestors to act on a "comply or explain" basis when engaging with inves-
tee firms, while asset managers are required to report on whether or
not they applied the Code. 170 Critics of the Code argue that given port-
folio diversification, relatively short holding periods, and passivity in
163 Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 1, at 30-31.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 50.
166 U.K., Fin. Reporting Council, The UK Stewardship Code (2012), available at
https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-GovernanceUK-Stew
ardship-Code-September-2012.pdf.
167 Defined in the Code as asset owners and asset managers with equity holdings
in UK listed companies; asset owners include pension funds, insurance companies,
investment trusts and other collective investment vehicles. The Code also applies
by extension to service providers such as proxy advisors and investment consul-
tants. Id. at 1-2.
168 Id. at 5.
169 Id. at 7.
170 Id. at 4.
126 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 14:1
tracking a market index, institutional investors are rationally apa-
thetic to corporate governance decisions. 171 They also point to the lack
of correlation between shareholder activism by traditional institu-
tional investors or improved corporate governance practices and the
maximisation of shareholder value. Some critics, placing their faith on
efficient markets, reject the notion of long termism and short termism
as well as the basis on which much of the criticism is levelled by stew-
ardship advocates against institutional owners. 172 Worthy though
they are, their concern is to protect the interests of the fund members,
and not of the investee company shareholders, 173 whose interests are
the concern of this article. It is in this context that the proposal ad-
vanced by Anabtawi and Stout discussed above makes eminent sense
as a way out of the current crisis posed by blockholder power to corpo-
rate governance. Corporate governance has in this sense entered its
fifth stage of evolution: from Berle and Means separation to agency
theory accountability, followed by the SOP tilt in favor of shareholders
to the rise of blockholder power, to the present where blockholder
power and managerial power can in combination work against the in-
terests of the larger body of shareholders. Two alternative strategies
are open to corporate governance to address the present problem: draw
a wedge between the manager-blockholder coalition of interests, or
harness it in a way that will promote the interests of the entire share-
holder body. While the solution of imposing a fiduciary obligation on
controlling shareholders proposed by Anabtawi and Stout is in line
with the latter solution, it would be difficult to apply it to managers in
the face of the business judgment rule. In the circumstances, the bet-
ter alternative is to drive a wedge between the blockholder-manager
coalition of interests by requiring on the one hand managerial passiv-
ity along with the requirement that the demand made by blockholders
be put to the general shareholder body, and on the other the imposi-
tion of a fiduciary obligation on blockholders. This way, there will be
no prohibitions placed on blockholder activity itself.
171 Matteo Tonello, The separation of ownership from ownership, HARv. L. SCH. F.
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Nov. 23, 2013), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/
corpgov/2013/11/25/the-separation-of-ownership-from-ownership/.
172 Id.
173 As evident in the preamble explaining the underlying aim of the Code princi-
ples, where it is stated, "[s]o as to protect and enhance the value that accrues to
the ultimate beneficiary, institutional investors should." The U.K Stewardship
Code, supra note 166, at 5.
